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Article 3

Fabulous Animals
HOLLY DUGAN AND KARL STEEL

W

ere dragons real? Can squirrels sail? Do bears rape people? Taken out
of context, such questions seem a bit ridiculous. The answer seems
both illusive and obvious: No. To distill literary tales about animals
into such simple questions about truth and fiction risks missing their point: they
focus on the wrong parts of the story, fixate on the literal embedded in the
metaphorical. Yet we start here to offer an incitement we think useful at this
critical moment for those of us studying human entanglements with animal lives
in the past: what would it mean to answer yes? What is historical in fiction? And
what is fabulous in history? What is the role of fabulous animals in historicallyminded critical animal studies?
Up at least through the end of the seventeenth century, the word
“fabulous” was a synonym for a particular kind of story: mostly classical
mythology, but also fables, that narrative genre in which animals, mountains, or
other supposedly voiceless things spoke, squabbled, and taught humans lessons
in wariness, justice, and, especially, social conservatism. 1Collections of fables
were foundational to medieval and early modern training in both literacy and the
affiliated skill of interpretation, and therefore also taught readers the necessity of
distinguishing fiction from truth. Young readers learned that while the narrative
itself was merely fabulous, the moral that followed the story (the epimythium) or
prefaced it (the promythium) was meant to provide a good, true lesson. Fiction
had its value because it was understood to be a vehicle for making the hunt for
truth a game.2
Most fable collections therefore led off with a story designed to teach
proper practices of reading: many began with a rooster that prefers a dunghill to
the gem it finds in it. The usual ending lesson explains that we should not be like
the rooster, preferring the base animal materials to the true moral values secreted
within these squalid and puerile narratives; another epimythium instead teaches
that we should be like the rooster and know our place, leaving the gems for
those who can appreciate them.3 Either way, the animal material is meant to be
understood as “fabulous,” fictional, connotatively equivalent to myths or even to
false hopes, as when a fourteenth-century English translator of a Latin history
sneers at the “fabulous” apocalyptic political hopes of the Welsh.4 The other
material, the moral, is meant to be understood as abstractly true, suitable for
reasonable creatures like the elite, literate, generally male humans who
themselves so rarely appear in fable narratives.
This interpretative split works best with stories of talking animals: the
clever fox who convinces a crow that its voice is beautiful, and then absconds
with the cheese that drops from the bird’s mouth as it proudly croaks out its
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song; the lion whose legal speech bullies other predators into giving him their
shares of a carcass; the mice who convince a sleeping lion that only a tyrant
would punish them for the lèse-majesté committed when they scampered across
his vast body as he slept: given the general humanist conviction that animals had
no spoken language, and certainly no language that could be shared between
species, these kinds of fables would have been easy to understand as mere
fictions, with the animals mere materializations of certain moral qualities, like
credulousness, gluttony, and meekness. If the trait is noble, then that too is
imaginatively surrendered to humans: in Phillip Sidney’s “Philisides,” for
instance, each beast offers its present to humanity: “the fox its craft,” the
crocodile, “its tears,” and the cony, “its skill to build.”5
It works less well, however, when the animal behaves only like any other
animal of its species. A rooster would probably prefer the contents of a dunghill
to the beauty of a gem. The rooster’s thoughts about the gem may be only
fictional, but the rooster’s behaviors are exactly what one would expect. For this
supposedly “fabulous” story, a certain kind of truth resides on the side of the
narrative, one perhaps more solid than a moral that might change from telling to
telling, or that might be ignored, misused, or otherwise waylaid by the fable’s
reader. A rooster stands on a dunghill, eating what can be eaten: this really seems
to have the quality of truth, because it exists regardless of what the reader thinks
about it.
Yet truths more “fabulous”—in a modern sense of the word—can still
be found on the narrative side of things. Not all the animal narratives are either
obviously false stories of animal intelligence or true stories of unadorned bestial
appetites. One popular fable features a story of a clever and patient animal,
whose standard epimythia aims to teach exactly these qualities. This is the fable
of the crow and pitcher, which appears in Avianus’s foundational Latin
collection, in the late medieval collections of Caxton and his source, Steinhöwel,
and in other compendia through to our present.6 A crow finds a pitcher, its base
full of water, and cannot get its beak down the pitcher’s narrow neck. We might
imagine another fable of a clever crow that tricks a hapless monkey, equally
thirsty, into tipping the contents of the pitcher down the crow’s throat. Instead,
in the actual fable, the crow plunks a succession of pebbles into the pitcher to
displace the water up through its neck. The clever, patient crow quenches his
thirst, and, by imitating it, we learn, as Caxton explains, “that wytte or fapyence
is a moche fayr vertue, for by fapyence or wytte, thow Ihalt mowe refyfte to all
faultes.” This wit of the crow is, in fact, the wit of a crow: crows really can do
this.7 These notoriously clever birds have become the darlings of ethology, and
of posthumanists eager to crowd nonhumans in on humans’ arrogant claims to
lonely rationality. It could have been found in classical natural history, which
from Pliny through the bestiaries, held that crows were absolutely dedicated to
their nestlings and the recipients of news of the future from God Himself (even
if Isidore’s Etymologies, a foundational medieval encyclopedia, complained that
such belief was “a great sin”).8 Instead, we have a fable of crows being crows as
we know them. And as we know them, we stop being so sure of the mere
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fabulousness of fables, or we find new wonder in the world we thought we
already knew.

Still more fabulous behavior need not be sought out only among
mythical hybrids and other monsters. The “fabulous” animal—in the sense of
animals that inspire wonder, a suspension of certainty— could just as well be
sought at home, among the jumble of outmoded and disdained knowledges of
the Middle Ages and early modern periods. For prior to the rise of modern
animal science, what might strike us as only mundane animals were thought to
practice a wide range of naturally bizarre behavior. Consider, for instance, the
account of sailing squirrels in Edward Topsell’s History of Foure-Footed Beasts:
when hunger or some conuenient prey of meat costraineth her to passe
ouer a riuer, shee seeketh out soe rinde or small barke of a Tree which
shee setteth vppon the Water, and then goeth into it, and holding vppe
her taile like a saile, letteth the winde driue her to the other side.
Topsell names Olaus Magnus as his source; this fact also appears in Olaus’
contemporary Conrad Gesner. The belief in sailing squirrels appears as early as
the thirteenth century, in the natural histories of Vincent of Beauvais and
Thomas of Cantimpré, the latter of which would be adapted delightfully in this
medieval Dutch verse, “ende [the squirrel] sitter op, alst in een scip ware, / ende
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metten staerte seyltet over dare.” Even Carl Linnaeus includes sailing squirrels in
his great work of taxonomy (“superfluum cibum defodit; Cortice interdum
navigat”), while it shows up as late as the children’s classic Squirrel Nutkin.9
Needless to say, squirrels do not actually navigate across rivers on scraps of
wood, using their tails as sails. But for nearly five hundred years, the most
reputable scientific sources believed they did. There was the fabulous, up in a
tree, just outside our window.
Let this be a temptation to imagine outdated ethologies as other sites of
the fabulous, the mythical, the strange. Too often this material continues to be
considered embarrassing, too often subjected to what we might call scientific
Euhemerizing. Skeptical ancients, Christian and pagan both, insisted that
centaurs were “really” just very able riders, and that the gods had once been only
human heroes with names like Zeus or Hercules, and more recent rationalists
have held that supposed werewolves were really just people with hypertrichosis,
that is, thick hair growth all over the body. By the same logic, we might imagine
that someone had once perhaps witnessed a squirrel afloat on a bit of wood
amid a swollen river, and perhaps that squirrel had leapt to the bank and
scampered up an acorn-swollen tree. But what of it? If this had been the origin
of a story that in the thirteenth century entered squirrel lore — a rather thin
archive, to be sure —it still does not exhaust the thrill of imagining that these
nimble creatures in times of need collectively decide to become sailors. What
wonder! This ethology should be taken as a kind of counternatural natural
history, not as yet another record of power/knowledge or mere delivery to the
mastery of instrumental reason, but rather as a site of resistance to the
complacency of the known, and of the domestic, even parochial certainty that
the fabulous can only be expected “out there.”
The category “nature” too often functions as the great comforting
“ought”: it is what we ought not to be (because we are civilized); it is what we
ought to be (because we are God’s creatures, or because of the implacable and
inevitably antifeminist rationality of genes). Counternatural history, materials
from nonhumans that topple our natural categories, is fabulous history, a yoking
of these opposites that speaks fiction and truth at the same time: a truth infested
with the uncertainty of fiction.
One last example before we introduce the articles themselves: we
recommend Colin Dickey’s recent review of Marah J. Hardt’s Sex in the Sea,
which, like Joan Roughgarden’s Evolution’s Rainbow, frustrates any attempt to
ground a supposedly fundamental gender binary in nature. 10 Dickey begins
“First, it’s important to ruin Finding Nemo for you.”11 We might humbly suggest
the following revision: First, it’s important to make Finding Nemo fabulous.
The natural world swarms with parthenogenetic female wasps,
multigendered flounders, while the vast majority of life — which is microscopic
— reproduces without sexual congress at all. Amid these swarms, we hairy
terrestrial vertebrates are the aberrations.12 We are the fabulous animals. This is
not a matter of playing the cosmopolitan skeptic, like Montaigne, and simply
seeing things from another perspective, but rather of recognizing how very
parochial our way of life is. The other perspective really ought to be the default.

49

Early Modern Culture

Properly understood, Nemo made “weird” by an accurate natural history is far
less fabulous than we bare, forked, generally binary creatures are.
This collection of essays and responses is thus our attempt to capture
some of the lively debate around these issues that happened last spring at the
2015 Annual Meeting of the Shakespeare Association of America.13 There, two
very different seminars on animal studies—Karen Raber’s seminar on “animal
materialism” as well as ours on “animal encounters”—allowed a group of us
working in medieval, early modern, and Enlightenment-era critical animal studies
to begin a conversation about our shared approaches and our differences in
studying animals: For whom are we speaking when we write about animals?
Should our work actively contribute to improving animal lives? What do we
mean by the term animal and what is included in its definition? And, perhaps
most surprising: are we working on “real” animals?
These essays and their responses have been curated to reflect this
encounter: We’ve chosen the theme of fabulous animals as a reminder that
animals and the stories we tell about them have long and complicated histories.
What are the fictions embedded in our current material investments in animal
lives? What are the roles of fabulous animals (and fabulous knowledge about real
animals) in this field that has been dominated by historicist methods of research?
To begin to capture the liveliness of our debate, we’ve invited participants from
both seminars to write and respond: all of the essays focus on animals that are
fabulous in a modern sense, in that they seem more the stuff of history or myth.
A few are fabulous in early modern ways, in that they seem to materially emerge
from classical myth or from the “native” mythical materials of Germanic
legend—the dragon at the heart of Jan Stirm's essays. Others are more familiar,
like the cats rendered diabolical through witchcraft in Chris Clary’s essay. Some
emerge as fabulous only when interpreted against our human scales of
measurement—the squirrels elevated on shields in Kathryn Will’s study of
armory. And some frustrate both material and mythical approaches—the single
bee that Keith Botelho traces in his essay. Read together, these animals are both
familiar and fabulous. And, as our three respondents argue in their thoughtful
and generous readings of the essays, these animals provide a way to evaluate
both where the field has been focused in the past and where it might be heading.
That dragons and bees are discussed here with historicist methods, while
cats and squirrels take on sinister and noble allegorical meanings is an irony not
lost on us, and hopefully not on you. The dragons, satanic cats, bees, heraldic
squirrels, and yes, even fabulous Nemo offer a provocation. Let’s begin.
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